Owner agreements: jobs, money, seats, votes, exitsAcuerdos entre socios: empleo, dinero, asientos, votos, salidas
An investor puts in $60,000 for 25% of a corporation whose three other owners each put in $25,000 and work full time. She fears they will pay themselves salaries and never declare a dividend. Which protection is strongest?
The reliable tools are structural: a preferred class, a mandatory distribution formula, and a unanimity lock on changing them. Promises and duties are weak substitutes.Las herramientas confiables son estructurales: una clase preferente, una fórmula de distribución obligatoria y un candado de unanimidad para cambiarlas. Las promesas y los deberes son sustitutos débiles.
Class slides, ch. 3 (dividends)
A corporation has 400 shares and elects four directors each year. Dana owns 100 shares. The other owners vote as a bloc against her. Under which rule can she guarantee herself a seat?
Cumulative voting multiplies shares by seats and lets the holder concentrate them. In Texas it exists only if the certificate of formation grants it, so it must be negotiated at formation.El voto acumulativo multiplica acciones por asientos y permite concentrarlos. En Texas solo existe si el acta constitutiva lo otorga, así que hay que negociarlo al constituir.
TBOC § 21.360
A founder gives an investor a proxy to vote the founder's shares, stated to be irrevocable, as part of a loan secured by those shares. A year later the founder tries to revoke it. Can he?
The interest (the pledge) is what makes the irrevocability stick; without it the founder could revoke at will.El interés (la prenda) es lo que hace que la irrevocabilidad se sostenga; sin él, el fundador podría revocar a voluntad.
TBOC §§ 21.367–21.368
What distinguishes a voting trust from a pooling agreement?
Title is the line: trustee votes versus owners' mutual promise. Lenders like trusts because they control the seats directly.La diferencia es la titularidad: vota el fiduciario frente a la promesa mutua de los dueños. A los acreedores les gustan los fideicomisos porque controlan los asientos directamente.
TBOC §§ 6.251–6.252
A shareholders' agreement requires any seller to offer shares to the company first. A shareholder sells to an outsider who has never seen the agreement and whose stock certificate carries no legend. Can the company enforce the restriction against the buyer?
The restriction is reasonable and valid, but notice is the price of binding buyers: put the legend on the certificate.La restricción es razonable y válida, pero la publicidad es el precio para obligar a compradores: pon la leyenda en el título.
TBOC § 21.213
Under a first-option clause (as opposed to a right of first refusal), who names the price first?
First refusal reacts to a real outside offer; first option (right of first offer) starts with the seller's own terms.El derecho de preferencia reacciona a una oferta externa real; la primera oferta empieza con los términos del propio vendedor.
Class slides, ch. 3 (stock transfer restrictions)
After Ritchie v. Rupe, a minority shareholder in a Texas close corporation who is frozen out of employment and dividends may rely on which of the following?
Ritchie narrowed oppression to the receivership statute and sent minorities back to the drafting table: the agreement is the real protection.Ritchie redujo la opresión al remedio legal del interventor y devolvió a las minorías a la mesa de redacción: el convenio es la verdadera protección.
Ritchie v. Rupe (Tex. 2014); TBOC § 11.404
A agreement fixes when an owner's interest must be purchased, at what price, and how the purchase will be , for example through key person insurance or installment payments.
Trigger, price, funding: all three or the clause fails when it is needed.Detonante, precio y financiamiento: los tres o la cláusula falla cuando se necesita.
Why do some courts refuse to enforce an agreement among shareholders that guarantees a particular person the job of president?
AnswerRespuesta: Because statutes vest management in the board of directors, and an agreement that binds directors in advance can be seen as sterilizing the board's discretion. Courts are more willing to enforce such agreements in close corporations where all shareholders sign, no creditor or minority is harmed, or the provision sits in the certificate of formation; even then the remedy may be damages rather than the job.
- board manages the corporation
- sterilizing board discretion
- enforced more readily in close corporations when all shareholders agree
- damages rather than reinstatement
Two founders own a company 50/50 and have stopped speaking. Which clause, drafted at formation, would have helped most?
Without a drafted exit, the statutory answer to deadlock is a receiver or judicial winding up, which destroys value for both.Sin salida pactada, la respuesta legal al bloqueo es un interventor o la liquidación judicial, que destruye valor para ambos.
TBOC § 11.314; class slides, ch. 3