Corporate governance: board, duties, shareholdersGobierno corporativo: consejo, deberes, accionistas
Four of seven directors of a Texas corporation want to remove the two founders from the board. Who has the power to remove directors?
The board majority can outvote the founders on strategy and can replace officers, but only the shareholders elect and remove directors.La mayoría del consejo puede ganarles a los fundadores en estrategia y reemplazar a los officers, pero solo los accionistas eligen y remueven consejeros.
TBOC § 21.409
The board fires the CEO, who has a three-year employment contract and is also a director. What follows?
Power and liability are separate questions: the board can remove, and the corporation may pay for it. Undefined words like 'cause' decide how much.Poder y responsabilidad son preguntas distintas: el consejo puede remover, y la sociedad quizá pague por ello. Palabras sin definir como 'cause' deciden cuánto.
TBOC § 3.104; class slides, ch. 3 (officer positions)
A director's construction company received $3 million in payments from the corporation last year. Under NYSE rules, is she independent?
Independence is defined by bright-line relationships: recent employment, significant payments, family ties, interlocks. Conflicted directors cannot sit on audit or compensation committees.La independencia se define con reglas claras: empleo reciente, pagos significativos, parentesco, cargos cruzados. Los consejeros con conflicto no pueden integrar los comités de auditoría o compensaciones.
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02
A company listed on Nasdaq wants its CFO to chair the audit committee because he knows the numbers best. Permitted?
Since Sarbanes-Oxley, the audit committee is the shareholders' independent check on management's numbers; management cannot sit on it.Desde Sarbanes-Oxley, el comité de auditoría es el control independiente de los accionistas sobre los números de la administración; la administración no puede integrarlo.
SOX § 301; Exchange Act Rule 10A-3
Shareholders of a public company vote 60% against the executive pay package in the say-on-pay vote. Legal effect?
Say on pay is Dodd-Frank's non-binding vote held at least every three years; its force is reputational.El say on pay es el voto no vinculante de Dodd-Frank, al menos cada tres años; su fuerza es reputacional.
Dodd-Frank § 951; Exchange Act § 14A
Three outside directors who make up the audit committee never read the financial reports, skip meetings, and brush off two letters from a controller warning of fake sales; meanwhile the CEO inflates earnings and the directors sell stock at the inflated price. Best characterization?
The oversight duty asks for a good-faith effort to monitor and to respond to red flags; ignoring warnings while profiting is the pattern the SEC pursued against the body-armor company's directors.El deber de supervisión exige un esfuerzo de buena fe por vigilar y reaccionar ante señales de alarma; ignorar avisos mientras se obtiene provecho es el patrón que la SEC persiguió contra los consejeros de la empresa de chalecos blindados.
In re Caremark; casebook ch. 5 (SEC body-armor case)
When does the business judgment rule protect a board decision?
The rule is a presumption about process: informed, disinterested, good faith. The plaintiff must rebut it; otherwise courts do not second-guess.La regla es una presunción sobre el proceso: informado, desinteresado, de buena fe. El actor debe desvirtuarla; si no, los tribunales no revisan el fondo.
Aronson v. Lewis (Del. 1984); TBOC § 21.419 (2025)
A board rejects a premium takeover bid partly because the buyer plans to close the company's plant and lay off a thousand local workers. In a state with a constituency statute, is this a breach?
About thirty states authorize boards to consider other constituencies; Delaware does not, though its boards have wide discretion in weighing long-term value.Unos treinta estados autorizan al consejo a considerar a otros grupos de interés; Delaware no, aunque sus consejos tienen amplia discreción para ponderar el valor de largo plazo.
Class slides, ch. 5 (to whom is the duty owed)
The presumes that directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action was in the company's best interest.
Memorize the three elements; every governance essay uses them.Memoriza los tres elementos; todo ensayo de gobierno corporativo los usa.
A corporation's certificate contains an exculpation clause. Which claim against a director can it defeat?
Exculpation separates breach from payment: a careless director may have breached the duty of care and still owe nothing, while disloyalty remains fully exposed.La exoneración separa el incumplimiento del pago: un consejero descuidado puede haber violado el deber de diligencia y no deber nada, mientras la deslealtad sigue expuesta.
DGCL § 102(b)(7); TBOC § 7.001
Shareholders claim the board wasted corporate funds by paying the CEO a bonus unrelated to performance. Direct or derivative claim, and why?
AnswerRespuesta: Derivative. The injury (money leaving the treasury) was suffered by the corporation, and any recovery would go to the corporation; the shareholders are harmed only indirectly through the value of their shares. They must make written demand on the board (and in Texas usually wait 90 days) or plead demand futility, and may face an ownership threshold if the certificate adopts one under the 2025 reforms.
- derivative
- injury to the corporation, recovery to the corporation
- demand on the board or futility
- Texas 90-day wait; possible ownership threshold
Under the 2025 Texas reforms, which of the following may a nationally listed Texas corporation adopt?
SB 29 is Texas competing with Delaware: stronger presumption for boards, higher hurdles for suits, reinforced independent committees, and a specialized Business Court to hear the disputes.La SB 29 es Texas compitiendo con Delaware: presunción más fuerte para el consejo, barreras más altas para demandar, comités independientes reforzados y un Business Court especializado.
TBOC §§ 21.419, 21.552, 21.373 (2025); class slides, ch. 5 (Texas developments)