lack Letter
KOregon Supreme Court, 1932draftborradorunverifiedsin verificar

Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co.

141 Or. 306, 16 P.2d 627 (1932)

Horse meat scraps at 49.5% protein, and the trade says that counts as 50

In one lineEn una línea
When both parties are in a trade, words carry the trade's meaning even if they look plain to an outsider.Si ambas partes son del mismo gremio, las palabras tienen el significado del gremio aunque parezcan claras para un extraño.
RuleRegla
Evidence of a usage of trade is admissible to show what seemingly unambiguous words meant to parties who contracted within that trade; the plain meaning rule does not bar it.
Why this case is herePor qué está aquí este caso
It is the case Crespi uses to show that trade usage can give apparently plain words a different meaning: the first step in the UCC § 1-303 hierarchy.
Procedural posturePostura procesal
Seller sued for the price; the trial court treated “minimum 50% protein” as unambiguous, refused evidence of trade usage and gave judgment for the buyer. The seller appealed.

Facts

Hurst sold W.J. Lake & Co. a quantity of horse meat scraps under a contract calling for “minimum 50% protein,” with a price reduction of $5 per ton for scraps testing below 50%. Several lots tested between 49.53% and 49.96%. The buyer took the reduction; the seller said that in the trade “50% protein” meant anything at or above 49.5%, so no reduction was owed.

Procedural posture

The seller sued for the unpaid balance. The trial court held the words unambiguous, excluded the evidence of trade usage and entered judgment for the buyer. The seller appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether evidence of a usage of trade may be used to show that “minimum 50% protein” meant 49.5% or more to parties dealing in horse meat scraps, even though the words look clear on their face.

Holding

Yes. Reversed. The usage evidence is admissible, because words take their meaning from the trade in which both parties operate.

Reasoning

Language is not self-defining; “plain meaning” is itself a conclusion about what the parties meant. Where both parties belong to a trade with a settled usage, the usage is the dictionary they were using, and a court that ignores it rewrites the bargain. The buyer’s argument that the number is mathematically exact proves too much: trades routinely use numbers with tolerances. The losing argument (the parol evidence rule bars changing the writing) fails because the usage does not contradict the writing; it explains it.

Rule (own words)

A usage of trade known to both parties supplies the meaning of contract terms, and a court must admit evidence of it even when the words seem unambiguous. Modern codification: UCC § 1-303(c), (d) and R.2d § 222.

What-ifs

  • If the usage contradicted an express term outright, the express term would control (UCC § 1-303(e)).
  • If one party were outside the trade, the usage binds only if that party knew or had reason to know of it.

Likely follow-upsRepreguntas probables

The contract said “minimum 50% protein.” How can 49.5% satisfy that?
Because the court lets the trade define the words: among dealers in horse meat scraps, lots testing 49.5% or more were sold as 50% protein, and both parties were in that trade.
Does the plain meaning rule disappear?
No. The court says words are not plain in the abstract; usage proves what they meant to these parties. Today UCC § 1-303 makes usage of trade part of the agreement unless carefully negated.
What if the buyer were new to the trade?
Then the usage would bind only if the buyer knew or should have known of it (R.2d § 220; UCC § 1-303(c) requires regularity such that an expectation is justified).
usage of tradeplain meaning rulecourse of dealing

AssignedAsignado: 2026-10-29

Read the public opinionLeer la opinión (texto público). SourceFuente: Own brief from the public opinion; assigned in ASS#10 for Oct 29.