lack Letter
KSupreme Court of Alabama, 1845draftborradorunverifiedsin verificar

Kirksey v. Kirksey

8 Ala. 131 (1845)

A widow who moved sixty miles for a promised home, then was turned out

In one lineEn una línea
A promise to let a relative live on the promisor's land is a gratuitous promise; moving to accept the gift is a condition of it, not consideration.La promesa de dejar vivir a una pariente en la tierra del promitente es gratuita; mudarse para recibir el regalo es una condición, no consideration.
RuleRegla
A promise is supported by consideration only if the promisor sought the promisee's act in exchange for it; an act the promisee must perform merely to receive a gift does not make the promise enforceable.
Why this case is herePor qué está aquí este caso
The gift-promise case next to Hamer: moving in response to a promise is not consideration when the move was merely a condition of receiving a gift rather than the price the promisor sought. It is also the case that later courts and R.2d § 90 answered with promissory estoppel.
Procedural posturePostura procesal
The widow sued her brother-in-law for breaking his promise to give her a place to live; the jury found for her; the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed.

Facts

Antillico Kirksey, a widow with children, lived on public land she might have been able to keep. Her brother-in-law wrote that if she would come down and see him he would let her have a place to raise her family. She gave up her land, moved sixty miles with her children, and lived in a house on his land for two years. He then moved her to a worse house in the woods and later required her to leave.

Procedural posture

She sued; the jury awarded $200; the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, holding the promise unenforceable.

Issue

Whether her move in response to the letter was consideration for the brother-in-law’s promise.

Holding

No. The promise was a mere gratuity; the move was a condition of receiving the gift, not something the promisor bargained for.

Reasoning

The majority saw a kind relative offering a home, not a man buying a sister-in-law’s relocation. Because the promisor sought nothing for himself, there was no exchange, and without exchange there is no consideration. The writing judge noted his own disagreement.

Rule (own words)

Ask what the promisor wanted. If the promisee’s act was the price, there is a bargain; if it was just the way to collect a gift, there is not.

What-ifs

  • The brother-in-law needed help farming and wrote: come work the land with me and I will give you a house. Bargain; consideration.
  • Same facts today: promissory estoppel (R.2d § 90) likely enforces the promise to the extent of her reliance.
  • She moved but had never received the letter and did not know of the promise: no reliance and no bargain; nothing.

Likely follow-upsRepreguntas probables

The widow gave up her own land and moved sixty miles. Why is that not detriment?
It was a detriment, but not a bargained-for one: the brother-in-law did not want her move as the price of his promise; he wanted to help her, and moving was simply what she had to do to receive the help.
How would the case come out under R.2d § 90?
Probably for the widow: the promise should reasonably have been expected to induce her to move, it did, and injustice can be avoided only by enforcement, at least to the extent of her reliance.
What did the judge who wrote the opinion think?
He said he thought the loss and inconvenience of moving was sufficient consideration, but the majority treated the promise as a mere gratuity.
considerationgratuitous promise (nudum pactum)promissory estoppelbargain theory of consideration

Compare withComparar con: Hamer v. Sidway (contrasts), Ricketts v. Scothorn (contrasts)

AssignedAsignado: 2026-09-24

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