KSupreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1825draftborradorunverifiedsin verificar

Mills v. Wyman

20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825)

A father's promise to pay for a dying son's care, made after the care

In one lineEn una línea: A promise to pay for services already rendered to the promisor's adult son is not enforceable; past benefit and moral obligation are not consideration.La promesa de pagar servicios ya prestados al hijo adulto del promitente no es exigible; el beneficio pasado y la obligación moral no son consideration.
RuleRegla: A moral obligation does not support a promise unless it coincides with a legal obligation that was once enforceable and has been barred (debts discharged in bankruptcy, barred by limitations, or incurred during minority); a promise to pay for a past benefit conferred on a third person is a nudum pactum.
Why this case is herePor qué está aquí este caso: Assigned Oct. 6 with Webb and R.2d § 86: a promise to pay for a benefit already received is unsupported by consideration, and a moral obligation alone does not make it binding. Webb v. McGowin is the exception that § 86 later codified.
Procedural posturePostura procesal: The caregiver sued the father on a written promise to pay expenses already incurred; the trial court directed a nonsuit and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Facts

Levi Wyman, twenty-five, returned sick from a sea voyage and was cared for by Mills for about two weeks until he died. Afterward Levi’s father, Seth Wyman, wrote to Mills promising to pay the expenses. He later refused.

Procedural posture

Mills sued on the promise; nonsuit at trial; affirmed.

Issue

Whether a father’s written promise to pay for care already given to his adult son is supported by consideration.

Holding

No. The services were rendered before the promise and not at the father’s request; the promise rested on moral obligation alone and was unenforceable.

Reasoning

The court acknowledged the father’s moral duty but held that the law enforces only promises supported by consideration or by a pre-existing legal obligation that the promise revives. The son was an adult, so the father had no legal duty to support him; the kindness of a stranger created no debt.

Rule (own words)

A thank-you promise for a favor already done is not a contract. The exceptions are promises that bring back a debt the law once recognized.

What-ifs

The father had asked Mills to care for his son and promised payment beforehand: bargain, enforceable.
The son had been a minor: the father’s legal duty of support might make the promise enforceable as recognizing a legal obligation.
Webb v. McGowin facts: the promisor himself received a material benefit; many courts and § 86 enforce the later promise.

Likely follow-upsRepreguntas probables

Why does the law refuse to enforce such a decent promise?

Because the care was given before any promise and not at the father's request; nothing was exchanged for the promise. The court leaves the enforcement to conscience.

Which moral obligations are enforceable?

Those that revive a legal duty once binding: a new promise to pay a debt barred by limitations or discharged in bankruptcy, or a promise made after reaching majority to pay a debt incurred as a minor.

Mexican comparison?

A natural obligation (obligación natural) cannot be demanded but, once paid, cannot be recovered; and a promise to pay could be a donation enforceable with the right form. The civil law gets to the same place by different doors.

consideration moral obligation (R.2d § 86)past consideration

Compare withComparar con: Webb v. McGowin (contrasts)

AssignedAsignado: 2026-10-06

Read the public opinionLeer la opinión (texto público). SourceFuente: Own brief from the public opinion as excerpted in the casebook; verify quotations against the opinion..