lack Letter
KCourt of Appeals of Alabama, 1935draftborradorunverifiedsin verificar

Webb v. McGowin

27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935), cert. denied, 232 Ala. 374, 168 So. 199 (1936)

A worker crippled saving a man's life, paid for life until the estate stopped

In one lineEn una línea
A promise to compensate a rescuer who was crippled saving the promisor's life is enforceable because the promisor received a material benefit.La promesa de compensar a quien quedó lisiado por salvar la vida del promitente es exigible porque el promitente recibió un beneficio material.
RuleRegla
Where the promisee has conferred a material benefit on the promisor at the promisee's own detriment, the promisor's subsequent promise to pay for it is enforceable: the benefit received is treated as sufficient consideration, and the promise fixes the value of the moral obligation.
Why this case is herePor qué está aquí este caso
The exception to Mills v. Wyman (Oct. 6): where the promisor himself received a material benefit and later promised to pay for it, the promise is enforceable; R.2d § 86 adopts the idea with limits (no gift, not disproportionate).
Procedural posturePostura procesal
The rescuer sued the estate of the man he saved on a promise to pay him for life; the trial court sustained a demurrer; the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari.

Facts

Webb, working in a lumber mill, was dropping a heavy pine block from an upper floor when he saw McGowin below. To divert the block he fell with it, saving McGowin from death or serious injury and crippling himself for life. McGowin promised to pay Webb $15 every two weeks for the rest of Webb’s life and paid for about eight years until his death; the executors then stopped.

Procedural posture

Webb sued the executors; the trial court sustained a demurrer; the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, approving the result.

Issue

Whether a promise made after the promisor received a material benefit, in recognition of that benefit, is supported by consideration.

Holding

Yes. Saving a life and avoiding injury is a material benefit; the subsequent promise to compensate the rescuer for his detriment is enforceable, and the law implies a request.

Reasoning

The court reasoned that if the promisor would have been liable in quasi-contract for a benefit he requested, his later promise to pay for a benefit he actually received should likewise be enforced, with the promise fixing the amount; the moral obligation plus the material benefit supplied what a bare moral obligation lacks.

Rule (own words)

When you are the one who got the benefit and you then promise to pay for it, the promise sticks. Mills fails only because the father got nothing himself.

What-ifs

  • Webb had promised the rescue as a gift and expected nothing: no enforcement under § 86(2)(a).
  • McGowin promised $1 million a year: enforceable only to a proportionate extent under § 86(2)(b).
  • The promise was made before the rescue (I will pay you if you push the block away): ordinary bargain, no need for the exception.

Likely follow-upsRepreguntas probables

How is this different from Mills?
In Mills the benefit went to the son, a third person; here McGowin himself received the benefit of staying alive and uninjured, and he, not his estate, made the promise and paid for eight years.
What limits does § 86 add?
No enforcement if the benefit was conferred as a gift or the promisor was not unjustly enriched, and enforcement only to the extent the promise is not disproportionate to the benefit.
Why did the eight years of payments matter?
They showed the promise was serious and that the parties themselves valued the benefit; the estate's refusal looked like reneging on a settled arrangement.

Compare withComparar con: Mills v. Wyman (contrasts)

AssignedAsignado: 2026-10-06

Read the public opinionLeer la opinión (texto público). SourceFuente: Own brief from the public opinion as excerpted in the casebook; verify quotations against the opinion..